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IN THE Ul AI I COI J R I OF 4PPE : \ I -S

STAIEOF UTAH,

:

PlaintiffAppellee,

:

v.

:

JON DONALD HAMLING,

:

Case No. 2D000XI \ (\\

Defendant/y Appellant.

:

Priority No. 2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The state claims that the docket in this case shows that Defendant/Appellant Jon
Donald Hamling ("Appellant" or "Hamling") "was subsequently apprehended and booked
on October 11, 2000, i nore tl iai 11 w o moi iths after sentencing " State' s brief at 5, referring
to Docket,, I hird District Court Case No. 0019099844. The Docket actually shows only
that the "Clerk was advised the defendant is in Utah County Jail" on October 11, 2000,
and that the clerk faxed a copy of the Judgment to both the Salt Lake County and Utah
County jails on that day. See page 5 of Docket in \,(lciei icii in i to state's brief, ' The 1 )< icket
does not show w lien < >i \\h\ I litiuiiiiii was booked into the Utah County Jail.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The state argues that the issue of whether a defendant voluntarily absented himself
from sentencing is a question of fact which is reviewed for clear error. State* *»rv ;. 2,
7, n. 2. The state's position disregards State v. Anderson, 929 1' 'M 1 iu7, i iU6 ^Uiau

1996), where the Supreme Court clarified that this issue involves a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness. The Supreme Court stated:
This appeal involves only questions of law which we review for
correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). "Controlling
Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court decides
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)
(citations omitted).
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108. The Court then reviewed the issue of whether Anderson
voluntarily waived his right to presence as a question of law, pointing out in part that
ff

[a]ny waiver of the right to be present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional

relinquishment of a known right."1 Id. at 1110 (citation omitted).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
At sentencing, without affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak, the trial
judge noted for the record defense counsel's objection to sentencing Hamling in absentia.
R. 64:2. The trial judge stated, f,For the record, I will, notwithstanding, I'm sure, your
objection, Ms. Sisneros, mdfor the record, I'll note your objection, proceed with
sentencing at this time." R. 64:2 (emphasis added). Where a trial judge notes an
objection for the record then rules on the issue, fairness and practical considerations
require that the issue be considered preserved for appellate purposes. Given the trial
judge's statement, defense counsel was not in a position nor required to further outline
her objections. Because the trial judge noted defendant's objection and ruled on the issue,

2

the issues raised in this case were properly preserved for appeal.
Additionally, defense counsel alerted the judge to the constitutional and rule
violations which would occur if he were to sentence Hamling in absentia. The judge
ruled on the issue. This adequately preserved Hamling's arguments on appeal, all of
which relate to the due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 violations which occurred in this
case.
Moreover, defense counsel filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pointing
out that the sentence violated due process and Article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution. R. 41-42. This further preserved Hamling's legal claim raised in this case
that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence at sentencing.
Finally, even if the judge had not noted the objection for the record, this case
involves a sentence which was imposed in an illegal manner. Pursuant to Rule 22(e),
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court can review this issue even if it is raised for
the first time on appeal. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). While
Hamling raised this issue below and the state's claim that the issue was not preserved
must therefore be rejected, judicial economy and the mandates of Rule 22(e) would
require that this issue be reviewed even if it had not been preserved.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The state incorrectly relies on docket entries which were made in the trial court
after the case was on appeal and which are not a part of the record before this Court.
3

There is no subsequently developed evidence before this Court since there has not been
an additional hearing where information was presented to the judge. In the cases upon
which the state relies, the subsequently developed evidence was presented to the judge in
a motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment. Docket entries do not have the same
reliability as evidence presented to a judge. Additionally, while the docket entries show
that Hamling was in jail, they do not reflect the totality of the circumstances, including
when or why he was booked or any reasons for the absence at sentencing.
The trial court's failure to weigh Hamling's interest in being present for sentencing
against the public interest in proceeding also requires that the sentence be vacated in this
case where Hamling's interest in being presence outweighed any state interest in
proceeding.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SENTENCING HAMLING IN ABSENTIA.
A. THE POST-RULING DOCKET ENTRIES DO NOT ESTABLISH
THAT HAMLING KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS
RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT SENTENCING.
The state argues that this Court can consider post-ruling docket entries in
determining whether Hamling's absence at sentencing was voluntary. State's brief at 9.
The state argues further that this Court can conclude1 that Hamling's absence was
1

As set forth under the standard of review section of this reply brief, the issue of
whether Hamling knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence involves a

voluntary because the docket entries show he has not contacted the trial judge since the
sentencing hearing and explained his absence. State's brief at 9-10. The state's argument
ignores the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right as well as practical and
ethical considerations, and misreads the cases on which it relies for this proposition.
The state's claim fails because "evidence" has not been developed after the trial
court's initial ruling. After the trial judge denied the motion to correct illegal sentence on
August 30, 2000, hearing has not been held in this case and no "evidence" has been
presented to the trial court. Instead, a clerk has merely made an entry in the docket,
which is not part of the record before this Court, showing that Hamling is in jail. The
docket entries do not reflect the totality of circumstances relating to Hamling's absence.
Nor are they of the same character or reliability as a minute entry or recorded hearing in
which a judge participates and the clerk, court reporter or videotape records the events.
While the docket entries do reflect that Hamling was in Utah County Jail on October 11,
2000, and booked in the Salt Lake County Jail on October 16, 2000, they fail to provide
any other information such as when or why he was booked and, as such, do not reflect the
totality of the circumstances and should not be considered by this Court.
Additionally, the post-sentencing information was not considered by the trial judge
in making his voluntariness determination. Because the judge has not considered the
information, it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider it.
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Anderson, 929 P.2d P.2d at 1110.
5

The state's reliance on State v. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah App. 1989) and
Moore v. State. 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) for the
proposition that this Court may consider docket entries made subsequent to the
voluntariness ruling is also misplaced. See State's brief at 9. Unlike the present case
where the clerk made docket entries after the final judgment, in both Wagstaff and
Moore, the subsequently developed evidence was part of the record because the defendant
filed a motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment. These cases, therefore, do not
support the state's proposition that this Court may consider incomplete docket entries
which have never been presented to the trial court for review in determining whether the
trial judge correctly concluded that Hamling was voluntarily absent.
For example, in Wagstaff. the evidence subsequently developed was made a part
of the record prior to sentencing when the defendant asked the judge to arrest judgment
on his conviction following a trial in absentia. IdL at 988-89. In other words, although the
trial judge ruled prior to trial that the absence was voluntary and allowed the trial to
proceed in absentia, he again ruled that the absence was voluntary when the defendant
moved to arrest judgment. While Wagstaff does allow this Court to consider information
subsequently placed in the record where the trial judge also considered that information
when reconsidering his prior ruling, it does not, as the state suggests, allow this Court to
consider docket entries made after the case is on appeal.
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In Moore, the defendant made a motion for new trial after he was tried in absentia.
The appellate court indicated that in reviewing the issue of whether the trial court
correctly concluded that the defendant's absence was voluntary, it was appropriate to
consider evidence that was developed after the initial ruling. Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 261.
Because "appellant offered no evidence at his motion for new trial to indicate that his
absence was anything other than voluntary," the court upheld the trial judge's conclusion
that the absence was voluntary.
The state argues further that the docket entry is subsequently developed evidence
which should be considered by this Court because "[t]o exclude post-ruling evidence
would make it difficult for a defendant to show involuntary absence when moving to
correct an illegal sentence." State's brief at 9. Contrary to this assertion, if a defendant
moved in the trial court to correct an illegal sentence, a hearing would be held and the
parties would have the opportunity to present relevant evidence.
The state's argument that because the docket entries do not reflect an effort by
Hamling to contact the trial court and explain his absence, this Court should conclude that
the absence was voluntary (State's brief at 9-10) also fails because it incorrectly assumes
that the docket entries are an accurate record of all activity regarding the case.2 The
2

The state also argues that defense counsel's failure to give an explanation for the
absence as part of the motion to correct an illegal sentence shows that the absence was
voluntary. State's brief at 9-10. The motion to correct an illegal sentence was made
shortly after sentencing, before Hamling was being held at the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defense counsel therefore was not in a position to proffer an explanation.
7

docket is simply a summary made by the clerk. A lawyer could contact a judge or the
judge's clerk and request a sentencing review so that defendant could explain his absence
or otherwise ask for mercy, and such actions would not be reflected in the docket. If the
trial judge refused to review the sentence, the docket would not show any effort by the
defendant to explain his absence.
Additionally, the state's argument suggests that a defendant who is represented by
counsel should contact the court on his own, in an ex parte manner, to let the court know
why he was not present at sentencing. The appropriate forum for offering an explanation
for an absence would be in a scheduled review with both counsel present. When a review
has not been held, penalizing the defendant for not contacting the court with an
explanation would be inappropriate.3
Furthermore, the state's argument that because Hamling had notice and was not
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail, he had ,fthe burden of going forward to present
some 'sound reason' for his absence" after he was incarcerated (State's brief at 10-11)
fails because it disregards the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of a constitutional right. See State
v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,917 (Utah 1998) (citing inter alia Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S.
458, 462-63 (1938)). Rather than honoring this presumption against waiver, the state asks
3

Furthermore, some defendants are illiterate or have great difficulty expressing
themselves; not contacting the trial court from jail does not establish that an explanation
for the absence does not exist under these circumstances.
8

this Court to presume that a defendant's absence was voluntary where the post-sentencing
docket does not show an "effort to contact the court to explain his absence." State's brief
at 9. Requiring a defendant to contact the court after being sentenced in absentia and
explain the absence creates a presumption that the absence was voluntary if the defendant
does not make such contact; such a presumption in favor of waiver is contrary to
constitutional requirements.
Anderson and Wagstaff do state that "'[i]f [defendant's absence is deliberate
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence.'" Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111
(quoting Wagstaff 772 P.2d at 990) (emphasis added). They do not, however, create a
presumption that the absence was deliberate and voluntary, nor support the state's claim
that if the post-ruling docket does not show a reason for the absence, the absence must
have been voluntary. Instead, Anderson and Wagstaff merely indicate that if a defendant
deliberately fails to appear at trial, the trial may proceed without him unless he offers an
explanation.
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DID NOT REQUIRE THAT HAMLING BE
SENTENCED IN ABSENTIA.
As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 14-17, in determining whether a
constitutional or rule violation occurred in sentencing a defendant in absentia, courts must
weigh the public interest in proceeding without the defendant against the defendant's
interest in being present. In this case where the public interest in proceeding did not

9

outweigh Hamling's interest in being present, the trial judge erred in sentencing Hamling
in absentia.
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant Jon Donald Hamling respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //it day of June, 2001.

Qfeui <i, aw

JOAN C. WATT
NISA J. SISNEROS
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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